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Abstract. The classic result of Bulow and Klemperer [1] says that in a single-
item auction recruiting one more bidder and running the Vickrey auction achieves
a higher revenue than the optimal auction’s revenue on the original set of bidders,
when values are drawn i.i.d. from a regular distribution. We give a version of
Bulow and Klemperer’s result in settings where bidders’ values are drawn from
non-i.i.d. irregular distributions. We do this by modeling irregular distributions as
some convex combination of regular distributions. The regular distributions that
constitute the irregular distribution correspond to different population groups in
the bidder population. Drawing a bidder from this collection of population groups
is equivalent to drawing from some convex combination of these regular distribu-
tions. We show that recruiting one extra bidder from each underlying population
group and running the Vickrey auction gives at least half of the optimal auction’s
revenue on the original set of bidders.
Keywords: Bulow-Klemperer, irregular distributions, prior-independent, Vick-
rey auction
1 Introduction
Simplicity and detail-freeness are two much sought-after themes in auction design. The
celebrated classic result of Bulow and Klemperer [1] says that in a standard single-
item auction with n bidders, when the valuations of bidders are drawn i.i.d from a
distribution that satisfies a regularity condition, running a Vickrey auction (second-price
auction) with one extra bidder drawn from the same distribution yields at least as much
revenue as the optimal auction for the original n bidders. The Vickrey auction is both
simple and detail-free since it doesn’t require any knowledge of bidder distributions.
Given this success story for i.i.d. regular distributions, we ask in this paper, what is
the analogous result when we go beyond i.i.d regular settings? Our main result is a
version of Bulow and Klemperer’s result to non-i.i.d irregular settings. Our work gives
the first positive results in designing simple mechanisms for irregular distributions, by
parameterizing irregular distributions, i.e., quantifying the amount of irregularity in a
distribution. Our parameterization is motivated by real world market structures and in
turn indicates that most realistic markets will not be highly irregular with respect to this
metric. Our results enable the first positive approximation bounds on the revenue of the
second-price auction with an anonymous reserve in both i.i.d. and non-i.i.d. irregular
settings.
Before explaining our results, we briefly describe our setting. We consider a single-
item auction setting with bidders having quasi-linear utilities. That is the utility of a
bidder is his value for the item if he wins, less the price he is charged by the auc-
tion. We study auctions in the Bayesian setting, i.e. the valuations of bidders are drawn
from known distributions3. We make the standard assumption that bidder valuations are
drawn from independent distributions.
Irregular distributions are common. The technical regularity condition in Bulow and
Klemperer’s result is quite restrictive, and indeed irregular distributions are quite com-
mon in markets. For instance, any distribution with more than a single mode violates
the regularity condition. The most prevalent reason for a bidder’s valuation distribu-
tion failing to satisfy the regularity condition is that a bidder in an auction is randomly
drawn from a heterogeneous population. The population typically is composed of sev-
eral groups, and each group has its characteristic preferences. For instance the pop-
ulation might consist of students and seniors, with each group typically having very
different preferences from the other. While the distribution of preferences within any
one group might be relatively well-aligned and the value distribution might have a sin-
gle mode and satisfy the regularity condition, the distribution of a bidder drawn from
the general population, which is a mixture of such groups, is some convex combination
of these individual distributions. Such a convex combination violates regularity even in
the simplest cases.
For a variety of reasons, including legal reasons and absence of good data, a seller
might be unable to discriminate between the buyers from different population groups
and thus has to deal with the market as if each buyer was arriving from an irregular
distribution. However, to the least, most sellers do know that their market consists of
distinct segments with their characteristic preferences.
Measure of Irregularity. The above description suggests that a concrete measure of ir-
regularity of a distribution is the number of regular distributions required to describe it.
We believe that such a measure could be of interest in both designing mechanisms and
developing good provable revenue guarantees for irregular distributions in many set-
tings. It is a rigorous measure of irregularity for any distribution since any distribution
can be well-approximated almost everywhere by a sufficient number of regular ones and
if we allow the number of regular distributions to grow to infinity then any distribution
can be exactly described4 Irregular distributions that typically arise in practice are com-
binations of a small number of regular distributions and this number can be considered
almost a constant with respect to the market size. In fact there exist evidence in recent
[8, 6] and classical [12] microeconomic literature that irregularity of the value distribu-
tion predominantly arises due to market segmentation in a small number of parts (e.g.
loyal customers vs. bargain-hunters [8], luxury vs. low income buyers [6] etc). Only
highly pathological distributions require a large number of regular distributions to be
described — such a setting in a market implies that the population is heavily segmented
and each segment has significantly different preferences from the rest.
3 One of the goals of this work is to design detail-free mechanisms, i.e., minimize the depen-
dence on knowledge of distributions. Thus most of our results make little or no use of knowl-
edge of distributions. We state our dependence precisely while stating our results.
4 This follows from the fact that a uniform distribution over an interval is a regular distribution
and every distribution can be approximated in the limit using just uniform distributions.
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Motivated by this, we consider the following setting: the market/population con-
sists of k underlying population groups, and the valuation distribution of each group
satisfies the regularity condition. Each bidder is drawn according to some probability
distribution over these groups. That is bidder i arrives from group t with probability
pi,t. Thus if Ft is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of group t, the cdf of bid-
der i is Fi =
∑
t pi,tFt. For example, consider a market for a product that consists of
two different population groups, say students and seniors. Now suppose that two bid-
ders come from two cities with different student to senior ratios. This would lead to
the probability pi,t’s to be different for different i’s. This places us in a non-i.i.d. ir-
regular setting. All our results also extend to the case where these probabilities pi,t are
arbitrarily correlated.
Example 1 (An illustrative example). Consider an eBay seller of an ipad. One could
think of the market as segmented mainly in two groups of buyers: young and elder au-
dience. These two market segments have completely different value distributions. Sup-
pose for instance, that the value distribution of young people is distributed as a normal
distribution N(µy, σ) while the elder’s is distributed as a normal distribution N(µe, σ)
with µy > µe. In addition, suppose that the eBay buyer population is composed of
a fraction py young people and pe < py of elders. Thus the eBay seller is facing an
irregular valuation distribution that is a mixture of two Gaussian distribution with mix-
ture probabilities py and pe (see Figure 1). Even more generally, this mixture could be
dependent on the city of the buyer and hence be different for different buyers.
ΜyΜe
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Fig. 1. Left figure depicts pdf of the bimodal distribution of valuations of Example 1, while the
right figure depicts the revenue (dashed) R(q) = q · F−1(1 − q) where q is the probability of
sale, and the marginal revenue curve dR(q)
dq
for this distribution.
The eBay seller has two ways of increasing the revenue that he receives: a) increas-
ing the market competition by bringing extra bidders through advertising (possibly even
targeted advertising), and b) setting appropriately his reserve price in the second price
auction that he runs. Observe that he has no means of price discriminating. Even running
Myerson’s auction which is non-discriminatory for i.i.d. settings leads to randomiza-
tion. In particular, randomization leads to the undesirable feature of sometimes serving
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an agent with smaller value. This raises the main questions that we address in this paper:
how should he run his advertising campaign? How many people more (either through
targeted or non-targeted advertising) should he bring to the auction to get a good ap-
proximation to the optimal revenue? What approximation of the optimal revenue is he
guaranteed by running a Vickrey auction with a single anonymous reserve?
Giving a sneak preview of our main results, our paper gives positive results to all
the above questions: 1) bringing just one extra young bidder in the auction (targeted
advertising) and running a Vickrey auction with no reserve would yield revenue at least
1/2 of the optimal revenue (Theorem 2), 2) bringing 2 extra bidders drawn from the
distribution of the combined population (non-targeted advertising) would yield at least
1
2
(
1− 1
e
)
of the optimal revenue (Theorem 4), 3) running a Vickrey auction among the
original n bidders with an anonymous reserve price can yield an 8-approximation of the
optimal revenue (Theorem 5).
Our Results
First result (Section 3): Targeted Advertising for non-i.i.d. irregular settings. We show
that by recruiting an extra bidder from each underlying group and running the Vickrey
auction, we get a revenue that is at least half of the optimal auction’s revenue in the orig-
inal setting. While the optimal auction is manifestly impractical in a non-i.i.d. irregular
setting due to its complicated rules, delicate dependence on knowledge of distribution
and its discriminatory nature5, the Vickrey auction with extra bidders is simple and
detail-free: it makes no use of the distributions of bidders. The auctioneer must just be
able to identify that his market is composed of different groups and must conduct a tar-
geted advertising campaign to recruit one extra bidder from each group. This result can
be interpreted as follows: while advertising was the solution proposed by Bulow and
Klemperer [1] for i.i.d. regular distributions, targeted advertising is the right approach
for non-i.i.d. irregular distributions.
Tightness. While we do not know if the the factor 2 approximation we get is tight,
Hartline and Roughgarden [7] show that even in a non-i.i.d. regular setting with just
two bidders it is impossible to get better than a 4/3-approximation by duplicating the
bidders, i.e., recruiting n more bidders distributed identically to the original n bidders.
This lower bound clearly carries over to our setting also: there are instances where
recruiting only one bidder from each different population group cannot give anything
better than a 4/3-approximation.
Second result (Main result, Section 4): Just one extra bidder for hazard rate dominant
distributions. If the k underlying distributions are such that one of them stochastically
dominates, hazard-rate wise, the rest, then we show that recruiting just one extra bid-
der from the hazard rate dominant distribution and running the Vickrey auction gets at
5 The optimal auction in a non-i.i.d. setting will award the item to the bidder with the highest
virtual value and this is not necessarily the bidder with the highest value. In addition, typically
a different reserve price will be set to different bidders. This kind of discrimination is often
illegal or impractical. Also, the exact form of the irregular distribution will determine which
region’s of bidder valuations will need to be ”ironed”, i.e. treated equally.
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least half of the optimal revenue for the original setting. A distribution F hazard rate
dominates a distribution G iff for every x in the intersection of the support of the two
distributions the hazard rate hF (x)(= f(x)1−F (x) , where f(·) and F (·) are the pdf and
cdf respectively) is at most hG(x)(= g(x)1−G(x) , where g(·) and G(·) are the pdf and cdf
respectively). We denote such a domination by F hr G.
Further, hazard rate dominance requirement is not uncommon: for instance, if all the
k underlying distributions were from the same family of distributions like the uniform,
exponential, Gaussian or even power law, then one of them is guaranteed to hazard rate
dominate the rest. Though several common distributions satisfy this hazard rate domi-
nance property, it has never been previously exploited in the context of approximately
optimal auctions.
Third result (Section 5): Non-targeted advertising for i.i.d. irregular distributions. When
the bidders are identically distributed, i.e., the probability pi,t of distribution t getting
picked for bidder i is the same for all i (say pt), we show that if each pt ≥ δ, then
bringing Θ
(
log(k)
δ
)
extra bidders drawn from the original distribution (and not from
one of the k underlying distributions) yields a constant approximation to the optimal
revenue. Further in the special case where one of the underlying regular distributions
hazard rate dominates the rest and its mixture probability is δ then Θ
(
1
δ
)
bidders drawn
from the original distribution are enough to yield a constant approximation. This shows
that when each of the underlying population groups is sufficiently thick, then recruiting
a few extra bidders from the original distribution is all that is necessary.
Remark 1. For the latter result it is not necessary that the decomposition of the irregular
distribution that we use should resemble the actual underlying population groups. Even
if the market is highly fragmented with several population groups, as long as there
is mathematically some way to decompose the irregular distribution into the convex
combination of a few regular distributions our third result still holds.
Fourth result (Section 6): Vickrey with a Single (Anonymous) Reserve. Suppose we are
unable to recruit extra bidders. What is the next simplest non-discriminatory auction we
could hope for? The Vickrey auction with a single reserve price. We show that when
the non-i.i.d irregular distributions all arise as different convex combinations of the k
underlying regular distributions, there exists a reserve such that the Vickrey auction
with this single reserve obtains a 4k approximation to the optimal revenue. Though
the factor of approximation is not small, it is the first non-trivial approximation known
for non-i.i.d irregular distributions via Vickrey with anonymous reserve. In addition, as
we already explained, in typical market applications we expect the number of different
population groups k to be some small constant.
What is the best one can hope for a non-i.i.d irregular setting? Chawla, Hartline and
Kleinberg [2] show that for general non-i.i.d irregular distributions it is impossible to
get a o(log n) approximation using Vickrey auction with a single reserve price, and it
is unknown if this lower bound is tight, i.e., we do not yet know of a Θ(log n) approx-
imation. However the o(log n) impossibility exists only for arbitrary non-i.i.d irregular
settings and doesn’t apply when you assume some natural structure on the irregularity
of the distributions, which is what we do.
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To put our results in context: Single reserve price Vickrey auctions were also ana-
lyzed by Hartline and Roughgarden [7] for non-i.i.d regular settings, that showed that
there exists a single reserve price that obtains a 4-approximation. Chawla et al. [3]
show that when bidders are drawn from non-i.i.d irregular distributions, a Vickrey auc-
tion with a distribution-specific reserve price obtains a 2-approximation. Thus if there
are k different distributions, k different reserve prices are used in this result. This means
that if we insist on placing a single (anonymous) reserve price, this result guarantees
a O(1/k) approximation. In particular, when all distributions are different, i.e. k = n,
this boils down to a O(1/n) approximation.
In contrast, our result shows that even when all the distributions are different, as
long as every irregular distribution can be described as some convex combination of k
regular distributions, Vickrey with a single reserve price gives a factor 4k approxima-
tion. Further the factor does not grow with the number of players n.
Remark 2. We also show that if the bidders are distributed with identical mixtures and
the mixture probability is at least δ then Vickrey auction with a single reserve achieves a
Θ
(
1 + log(k)
nδ
)
approximation. If one of the regular distribution hazard rate dominates
the rest and has mixture probability δ, then Vickrey with a single reserve achieves a
Θ
(
1 + 1
nδ
)
approximation.
Observe that if all k regular distributions in the mixture have equal probability of
arriving, then our results shows that a Vickrey auction with a single reserve achieves
at least a Θ
(
1 + k log(k)
n
)
of the optimal revenue. This approximation ratio becomes
better as the number of bidders increases, as long as the number of underlying regular
distributions remains fixed. If the number of underlying distributions increases linearly
with the number of bidders, then the result implies a Θ(log(n)) approximation, match-
ing the lower bound of [3].
Related Work. Studying the trade-off between simple and optimal auctions has been a
topic of interest for long in auction design. The most famous result is the already dis-
cussed result of Bulow and Klemperer [1] for single-item auctions in i.i.d regular set-
tings. Hartline and Roughgarden [7] generalize [1]’s result for settings beyond single-
item auctions: they consider auctions where the set of buyers who can be simultane-
ously served form the independent set of a matroid; further they also relax the i.i.d con-
straint and deal with non-i.i.d settings. Dhangwatnotai, Roughgarden and Yan [5] study
revenue approximations via VCG mechanisms with multiple reserve prices, where the
reserve prices are obtained by using the valuations of bidders as a sample from the
distributions. Their results apply for matroidal settings when the distributions are reg-
ular, and for general downward closed settings when the distributions satisfy the more
restrictive monotone hazard rate condition. As previously discussed, Chawla et al. [3]
show that for i.i.d irregular distributions, Vickrey auction with a single reserve price
gives a 2-approximation to the optimal revenue and for non-i.i.d distributions Vickrey
auction with a distribution-specific reserve price guarantees a 2-approximation; Chawla
et al. [2] show that it is impossible to achieve a o(log n) approximation via Vickrey auc-
tion with a single reserve price for non-i.i.d irregular distributions. Single-item Vickrey
auctions with bidder specific monopoly reserve prices were also studied in Neeman [11]
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and Ronen [13]. Approximate revenue maximization via VCG mechanisms with supply
limitations were studied in Devanur et al. [4] and Roughgarden et al. [14].
2 Preliminaries
Basic model. We study single item auctions among n bidders. Bidder i has a value vi
for a good, and the valuation profile for all the n players together is denoted by v =
(v1, v2, . . . , vn). In a sealed bid auction each player submits a bid, and the bid profile
is denoted by b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn). An auction is a pair of functions (x,p), where x
maps a bid vector to outcomes {0, 1}n, and p maps a bid vector to Rn+, i.e., a non-
negative payment for each player. The players have quasi-linear utility functions, i.e.,
their utilities have a separable and linear dependence on money, given by ui(vi,v−i) =
vixi(v)− pi(v). An auction is said to be dominant strategy truthful if submitting a bid
equal to your value yields no smaller utility than any other bid in every situation, i.e.,
for all v−i, vixi(v) − pi(v) ≥ vixi(bi,v−i) − pi(bi,v−i). Since we focus on truthful
auctions in this paper b = v from now on.
Distributions. We study auctions in a Bayesian setting, i.e., the valuations of bidders are
drawn from a distribution. In particular, we assume that valuation of bidder i is drawn
from distribution Fi, which is independent from but not necessarily identical to Fj for
j 6= i. For ease of presentation, we assume that these distributions are continuous,
i.e., they have density function fi. We assume that the support of these distributions are
intervals on the non-negative real line, with non-zero density everywhere in the interval.
Regularity and irregularity. The hazard rate function of a distribution is defined as
h(x) = f(x)1−F (x) . A distribution is said to have a Monotone Hazard Rate(MHR) if h(x)
is monotonically non-decreasing. A weaker requirement on distributions is called reg-
ularity: the function φ(x) = x − 1
h(x) is monotonically non-decreasing. We do not
assume either of these technical conditions for our distributions. Instead we assume
that the market of bidders consists of k groups and each group has a regular distribution
Gi over valuations. Each bidder is drawn according to some (potentially different) con-
vex combination of these k regular distributions, i.e., Fi(x) =
∑k
t=1 pi,tGt(x). Such a
distribution Fi(·) in most cases significantly violates the regularity condition.
In fact, mathematically, any irregular distribution can be approximated by a convex
combination of sufficiently many regular distributions and as we take the number of
regular distributions to infinity then it can be described exactly. Thus the number of
regular distributions needed to describe an irregular distribution is a valid measure of
irregularity that is well-defined for any distribution.
Revenue Objective. The objective in this paper to design auctions to maximize expected
revenue, i.e., the expectation of the sum of the payments of all agents. Formally, the ob-
jective is to maximize Ev[
∑
i pi(v)]. Myerson [10] characterized the expected revenue
from any auction as its expected virtual surplus, i.e. the expected sum of virtual values of
the agents who receive the item, where the virtual value of an agent is φ(v) = v− 1
h(v) .
Formally, for all bidders i, Ev[pi(v)] = Ev[φi(vi)xi(v)]. The equality holds even if we
condition on a fixed v−i, i.e., Evi [pi(vi,v−i)] = Evi [φ(vi)xi(vi,v−i)].
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3 Targeted Advertising and the Non-i.i.d. Irregular Setting
In this section we give our version of Bulow and Klemperer’s result [1] for non-i.i.d
irregular distributions.
Theorem 1. Consider an auction among n non-i.i.d irregular bidders where each bid-
der’s distribution Fi is some mixture of k regular distributions {G1, . . . , Gk} (the set of
regular distributions is the same for all bidders but the mixture probabilities could be
different). The revenue of the optimal auction in this setting is at most twice the revenue
of a Vickrey auction with k extra bidders, where each bidder is drawn from a distinct
distribution from {G1, . . . , Gk}.
Proof. Bidder i’s distribution Fi(x) =
∑k
t=1 pi,tGt(x) can be thought of as being
drawn based on the following process: first a biased k-valued coin is flipped that de-
cides from which distribution Gt player i’s value will come from (according to the
probabilities pi,t), and then a sample from Gt is drawn. Likewise, the entire valuation
profile can be thought of as being drawn in a similar way: first n independent, and pos-
sibly non-identically biased, k-valued coin tosses, decide the regular distribution from
each bidder’s value is going to be drawn from. Subsequently a sample is drawn from
each distribution.
Let the random variable qi be the index of the regular distribution that bidder i’s
value is going to be drawn, i.e., qi is the result of the coin toss for bidder i. Let q
denote the index profile of all players. Let p(q) =
∏n
i=1 pi,qi be the probability that the
index profile q results after the n coin tosses. Let G(q) = ×iGqi be the joint product
distribution of players’ values conditioned on the profile being q.
Let Mq be the optimal mechanism when bidders’ distribution profile is q. Let RqM
be the expected revenue of mechanismMq. LetRqM (v) denote the revenue of the mech-
anism when bidders have value v. The revenue of the optimal mechanismM which can-
not learn and exploit the actual distribution profile q is upper bounded by the revenue
of the optimal mechanism that can first learn q. Therefore we have,
RM ≤
∑
q∈[1..k]n
p(q)E
v∼G(q)[R
q
M (v)] (1)
Now, E
v∼G(q)[R
q
M (v)] corresponds to the optimal expected revenue when bidder
i’s distribution is the regular distribution Gqi . Let k(q) denote the number of distinct
regular distributions contained in the profile q. Note that k(q) ≤ k for all q. Thus the
above expectation corresponds to the revenue of a single-item auction where players
can be categorized in k(q) groups and bidders within each group t are distributed i.i.d.
according to a regular distribution Gt. Theorem 6.3 of [14] applies to such a setting
and shows that the optimal revenue for each of these non-i.i.d regular settings will be
at most twice the revenue of Vickrey auction with one extra bidder for each distinct
distribution in the profile q. Hence,
RM ≤
∑
q∈[1..k]n
p(q)E
v∼G(q)[R
q
M (v)] ≤ 2
∑
q∈[1..k]n
p(q)E
v∼G(q)[RSPn+k(q)(v)] (2)
≤ 2
∑
q∈[1..k]n
p(q)E
v∼G(q)[RSPn+k(v)] (3)
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Since, the Vickrey auction with k extra bidders doesn’t depend on the index profile q
the RHS of (3) corresponds to the expected revenue of SPn+k when bidders come from
the initial i.i.d irregular distributions. ⊓⊔
The above proof actually proves an even stronger claim: the revenue from running
the Vickrey auction with k extra bidders is at least half approximate even if the auction-
eer could distinguish bidders by learning the bidder distribution profile q and run the
corresponding optimal auction RqM .
Lower bound. A corner case of our theorem is when each bidder comes from a dif-
ferent regular distribution. From Hartline and Roughgarden [7] we know that a lower
bound of 4/3 exists for such a case. In other words there exists two regular distributions
such that if the initial bidders came each from a different distribution among these,
then adding two extra bidders from those distributions will not give the optimal rev-
enue but rather a 4/3 approximation to it. The same lower bound proves that if bidders
came from the same mixture of these two regular distributions (i.e. are i.i.d), then the
expected revenue of the auction that first distinguishes from which regular distribution
each bidder comes from and then applies the optimal auction, yields higher revenue
than adding two extra bidders from the two distributions and running a Vickrey auction.
4 Just one extra bidder for hazard rate dominant distributions
In this section we examine the setting where among the k underlying regular distribu-
tions there exists one distribution that stochastically dominates the rest in the sense of
hazard rate dominance. Hazard rate dominance is a standard dominance concept used
while establishing revenue guarantees for auctions (see for example [9]) and states the
following: A distribution F hazard rate dominates a distribution G iff for every x in the
intersection of the support of the two distributions: hF (x) ≤ hG(x). We denote such a
domination by F hr G.
In such a setting it is natural to ask whether adding just a single player from the
dominant distribution is enough to produce good revenue guarantees. We actually show
that adding only one extra person coming from the dominant distribution achieves ex-
actly the same worst-case guarantee as adding k extra bidders one from each underlying
distribution.
Theorem 2. Consider an auction among n non-i.i.d irregular bidders where each bid-
der’s distribution Fi is some mixture of k regular distributions {G1, . . . , Gk} such that
G1 hr Gt for all t. The revenue of the optimal auction in this setting is at most twice
the revenue of a Vickrey auction with one extra bidder drawn from G1.
The proof is based on a new lemma for the regular distribution setting: bidders are
drawn from a family of k regular distributions such that one of them hazard-rate domi-
nates the rest. This lemma can be extended to prove Theorem 2 in a manner identical to
how Theorem 6.3 of Roughgarden et al. [14] was extended to prove Theorem 1 in our
paper. We don’t repeat that extension here, and instead just prove the lemma. The lemma
uses the notion of commensurate auctions defined by Hartline and Roughgarden [7].
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Lemma 1. Consider a non-i.i.d. regular setting where each player’s value comes from
some set of distributions {F1, . . . , Fk} such that F1 hr Ft for all t. The optimal
revenue of this setting is at most twice the revenue of Vickrey auction with one extra
bidder drawn from F1.
Proof. Let v denote the valuation profile of the initial n bidders and let v∗ the valuation
of the extra bidder from the dominant distribution. LetR(v, v∗) and S(v, v∗) denote the
winners of the optimal auction (M ) and of the second price auction with the extra bidder
(SPn+1) respectively. We will show that the two auctions are commensurate (see [7])
which is sufficient for proving the lemma. Establishing commensurateness boils down
to showing that:
Ev,v∗ [φS(v,v∗)(vS(v,v∗))|S(v, v
∗) 6= R(v, v∗)] ≥ 0 (4)
Ev,v∗ [φR(v,v∗)(vR(v,v∗))|S(v, v
∗) 6= R(v, v∗)] ≤ Ev,v∗ [pS(v,v∗)|S(v, v
∗) 6= R(v, v∗)]
(5)
where pS is the price paid by the winner of the second price auction. The proof of
equation (5) is easy and very closely follows the proof in [7] above.
We now prove equation (4). Since F1 hr Ft we have that for all x in the intersec-
tion of the support of F1 and Ft: h1(x) ≤ ht(x), which in turn implies that φ1(x) ≤
φt(x), since φt(x) = x− 1ht(x) . By the definition of winner in Vickrey auction we have
∀i : vS(v,v∗) ≥ vi. In particular, vS(v,v∗) ≥ v∗. If v∗ is in the support of FS(v,v∗), then
the latter, by regularity of distributions, implies that φS(v,v∗)(vS(v,v∗)) ≥ φS(v,v∗)(v∗).
Now F1 hr Ft implies that φS(v,v∗)(v∗) ≥ φ1(v∗) (since by definition v∗ must also
be in the support of F1). If v∗ is not in the support of FS(v,v∗), then since v∗ < vS(v,v∗)
and all the supports are intervals, it must be that v∗ is below the lower bound L of the
support of FS(v,v∗). Wlog we can assume that the support of F1 intersects the sup-
port of every other distribution. Hence, since v∗ is below L and the support of F1 is
an interval, L will also be in the support of F1. Thus L is in the intersection of the
two supports. By regularity of FS(v,v∗), F1 and by the hazard rate dominance assump-
tion, we have φS(v,v∗)(vS(v,v∗)) ≥ φS(v,v∗)(L) ≥ φ1(L) ≥ φ1(v∗). Thus in any case
φS(v,v∗)(vS(v,v∗)) ≥ φ1(v
∗). Hence, we immediately get that:
Ev,v∗ [φS(v,v∗)(vS(v,v∗))|S(v, v
∗) 6= R(v, v∗)] ≥ Ev,v∗ [φ1(v
∗)|S(v, v∗) 6= R(v, v∗)]
Conditioned on v the latter expectation becomes:
Ev∗ [φ1(v
∗)|S(v, v∗) 6= R(v, v∗),v]
But conditioned on v, R(v, v∗) is some fixed bidder i. Hence, the latter expectation is
equivalent to: Ev∗ [φ1(v∗)|S(v, v∗) 6= i] for some i. We claim that for all i the latter
expectation must be positive. Conditioned on v, the event S(v, v∗) 6= i happens only if
v∗ is sufficiently high, i.e., there is a threshold θ(v) such that S(v, v∗) 6= i happens only
if v∗ ≥ θ(v) (if i was the maximum valued bidder in the profile v then θ(v) = vi, else
θ(v) = 0.) By regularity of distributions, v∗ ≥ θ(v) translates to φ1(v∗) ≥ φ1(θ). So
we now have to show that: Ev∗ [φ1(v∗)|φ1(v∗) ≥ φ1(θ)] ≥ 0. Since the unconditional
expectation of virtual value is already non-negative, the expectation conditioned on a
lower bound on virtual values is clearly non-negative. ⊓⊔
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Examples and Applications. There are many situations where a hazard-rate dominant
distribution aactually exists in the market. We provide some examples below.
Uniform, Exponential, Power-law distributions. Suppose the k underlying distribu-
tions were all uniform distributions of the formU [ai, bi]. The hazard rate hi(x) = 1bi−x .
Clearly, the distribution with a larger bi hazard-rate dominates the distribution with
a smaller bi. If the k underlying distributions were all exponential distributions, i.e.,
Gi(x) = 1 − e
−λix
, then the hazard rate hi(x) = λi. Thus the distribution with the
smallest λi hazard rate dominates the rest. If the k underlying distributions were all
power-law distributions, namely, Gi(x) = 1 − 1xαi , then the hazard rate hi(x) =
αi
x
.
Thus the distribution with the smallest αi hazard-rate dominates the rest.
A general condition. If all the k underlying regular distributions were such that for
any pair i, j they satisfy 1 − Gi(x) = (1 − Gj(x))θij , then it is easy to verify that
there always exists one distribution that hazard-rate dominates the rest of the distribu-
tions. For instance, the family of exponential distributions, and the family of power-law
distributions are special cases of this general condition.
5 Non-Targeted Advertising and the i.i.d. Irregular Setting
In this section we consider the setting where all the bidders are drawn from the same
distribution F . We assume that F can be written as a convex combination of k regular
distributions F1, . . . , Fk, i.e. F =
∑k
t=1 ptFt and such that the mixture probability pt
for every distribution is at least some constant δ: ∀t ∈ [1, . . . , k] : pt ≥ δ. A natural
question to ask in an i.i.d. setting is how many extra bidders should be recruited from
the original distribution to achieve a constant fraction of the optimal revenue (i.e., by
running a non-targeted advertising campaign)?
In this section answer the above question as a function of the number of underlying
distributions k and the minimum mixture probability δ. We remark that our results in
this section don’t require the decomposition of F into the Ft’s resemble the distribu-
tion of the underlying population groups. Even if the number of underlying population
groups is very large, as long as there is some mathematical way of decomposing F
into k regular distributions with a minimum mixture probability of δ, our results go
through. Hence, one can optimize our result for each F by finding the decomposition
that minimizes our approximation ratio.
Theorem 3. Consider an auction among n i.i.d. irregular bidders where the bidders’
distributionF can be decomposed into a mixture of k regular distributions {G1, . . . , Gk}
with minimum mixture probability δ. The revenue of the optimal auction in this setting
is at most 2k+1
k
the revenue of a Vickrey auction with Θ
(
log(k)
δ
)
extra bidders drawn
from distribution F .
Proof. Suppose that we bring n∗ extra bidders in the auction. Even if the decomposition
of the distribution F doesn’t correspond to an actual market decomposition, we can
always think of the value of each of the bidders drawn as follows: first we draw a
number t from 1 to k according to the mixture probabilities pt and then we draw a
value from distribution Gt.
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Let E be the event that all numbers 1 to k are represented by the n∗ random numbers
drawn to produce the value of the n∗ extra bidders. The problem is a generalization of
the coupon collector problem where there are k coupons and each coupon arrives with
probability pt ≥ δ. The relevant question is, what is the probability that all the coupons
are collected after n∗ coupon draws? The probability that a coupon t is not collected
after n∗ draws is: (1 − pt)n
∗
≤ (1 − δ)n
∗
≤ e−n
∗δ
. Hence, by the union bound, the
probability that some coupon is not collected after n∗ draws is at most ke−n∗δ. Thus
the probability of event E is at least 1− ke−n∗δ . Thus if n∗ = log(k)+log(k+1)
δ
then the
probability of E is at least 1− 1
k+1 .
Conditional on event E happening we know that the revenue of the auction is the
revenue of the initial auction with at least one player extra drawn from each of the
underlying k regular distributions. Thus we can apply our main theorem 1 to get that
the expected revenue conditional on E is at least 12 of the optimal revenue with only the
initial n bidders. Thus:
RSPn+n∗ ≥
(
1−
1
k + 1
)
Ev,v˜∼Fn+n
∗ [RSPn+n∗ (v, v˜)|E ] ≥
(
1−
1
k + 1
)
1
2
RM
⊓⊔
Theorem 4. Consider an auction among n i.i.d. irregular bidders where the bidders’
distributionF can be decomposed into a mixture of k regular distributions {G1, . . . , Gk}
such thatG1 hazard rate dominatesGt for all t > 1. The revenue of the optimal auction
in this setting is at most 2 e
e−1 the revenue of a Vickrey auction with 1p1 extra bidders
drawn from distribution F .
Proof. Similar to theorem 3 conditional on the even that an extra player is drawn from
the hazard rate distribution, we can apply Lemma 1 to get that this conditional expected
revenue is at least half the optimal revenue with the initial set of players. If we bring
n∗ extra players then the probability of the above event happening is 1− (1− p1)n
∗
≥
1− e−n
∗p1
. Setting n∗ = 1
p1
we get the theorem. ⊓⊔
Prior-Independent Mechanisms. The two theorems above imply prior-independent mech-
anisms for the i.i.d. irregular setting based on a reasoning similar to the one used by [5]
in converting Bulow-Klemperer results to prior-independent mechanims in the i.i.d.
regular setting. Specifically, instead of bringing k extra i.i.d. bidders we could use the
maximum value of a random subset of k existing bidders as a reserve on the remaining
n − k bidders. The theorems above then imply that this prior-independent mechanism
yields a constant approximation with respect to the optimal mechanism among the n−k
bidders. Further, since the bidders are all i.i.d., and the k bidders were chosen before
their valuation are drawn, the expected optimal revenue among the n − k bidders is at
least 1− k
n
of the optimal revenue among the n bidders. Thus as long as the number of
bidders k required by Theorems 3 and 4 is smaller than n, this approach yields a prior-
independent mechanism with a meaningful revenue approximation guarantee. Hence,
Theorem 3 implies that if nδ ≥ c log(k) (i.e. the expected number of players from each
population is at least c log(k)) the random sampling mechanism described above is
2k+1
k
c
c−1 approximate. Similarly, Theorem 4 implies that it is 2
e
e−1
c
c−1 -approximate,
if n · p1 ≥ c, i.e. the expected number of players from the hazard-rate dominant distri-
bution at least c.
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6 Vickrey with Single Reserve for Irregular Settings
In this section we prove revenue guarantees for Vickrey auction with a single reserve in
the general irregular setting.
Theorem 5. Consider an auction among n non-i.i.d irregular bidders where each bid-
der’s distribution Fi is some mixture of k regular distribution {G1, . . . , Gk} (the set of
regular distributions is the same for all bidders but the mixture probabilities could be
different). The revenue of the optimal auction in the above setting is at most 4k times
the revenue of a second price auction with a single reserve price which corresponds to
the monopoly reserve price of one of the k distributions Gi.
Proof. We use the same notation as in Section 3. In particular, we let q denote the index
profile of distributions for all players and p(q) =
∏n
i=1 pi,qi be the probability that an
index profile arises. Let G(q) = ×iGqi be the product distribution that corresponds to
how players values are distributed conditional on the coin tosses having value q.
Let Mq be the optimal mechanism when bidders’ distribution profile is q. Let RqM
be the expected revenue of mechanism Mq. By equation (2) in Section 3 we have,
RM ≤
∑
q∈[1..k]n
p(q)E
v∼G(q)[R
q
M (v)] ≤ 2
∑
q∈[1..k]n
p(q)E
v∼G(q)[RSPn+k(q)(v)] (6)
Consider the auction SPn+k(q). If instead of adding the k(q) extra bidders, we place
a random reserve drawn from the distribution of the maximum value among the k(q)
extra bidders, and ran the Vickrey auction. Call the later SPn(R(q)). If the winner
of the auction SPn+k(q) is one among the original n bidders, clearly SPn+k(q) and
SPn(R(q)) will have the same expected revenue. Further, the expected revenue of
SPn+k(q) conditioned on the winner being one among the original n bidders is no
smaller than the expected revenue of SPn+k(q) conditioned on the winner being one
among the newly added k(q) bidders. Also, the probability that the winner comes from
the newly added k(q) bidders is at most 1/2. Thus SPn(R(q)) ≥ 12SPn+k(q). Combin-
ing this with Equation (6), we have
RM ≤ 2
∑
q∈[1..k]n
p(q)E
v∼G(q)[RSPn+k(q)(v)] ≤ 4
∑
q∈[1..k]n
p(q)E
v∼G(q)[RSPn(R(q))(v)]
=
k∑
t=1
4
∑
q∈[1..k]n
p(q)E
v∼G(q)[RSPn(R(q),t)(v)] (7)
≤ 4k
∑
q∈[1..k]n
p(q)E
v∼G(q)[RSPn(R(q),t∗)(v)] (8)
In equation (7), the revenue RSPn(R(q))(v) is written as
∑k
t=1RSPn(R(q),t)(v), i.e.,
as the sum of contributions from each population group. Given this split, there exists a
polulation group t∗ that gets at least 1
k
fraction of all groups together, and thus at least 14k
fraction of the optimal mechanism, which is what is expressed through inequality (8).
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Now the auction SPn(R(q)) from the perspective of the group t∗ is just the Vick-
rey auction run for group t∗ alone with a single random reserve of max{R(q), Maxi-
mum value from groups other than t∗}. However within the group t∗ since we are in
a i.i.d regular setting it is optimal to run Vickrey auction for the group t∗ alone with
the monopoly reserve price of that group. That is if we replace the single reserve of
max{R(q), Maximum value from groups other than t∗} with the optimal (monopoly)
reserve price for t∗, Vickrey auction for group t∗ with such a reserve gives no lesser rev-
enue, and this holds for every q! Finally, when we add in the agents from other groups,
single-item Vickrey auction’s revenue for the entire population with monopoly reserve
price of group t∗ is no smaller than the revenue of single-item Vickrey auction for group
t∗ alone with the monopoly reserve price of group t∗. Chaining the last two statements
proves the theorem. ⊓⊔
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